These days, cybercriminals are looking to steal more than just banking information.
through the comprehensive theft of more mundane information such as manufacturing processes, suppliers, customers, factory layout, contract terms, general know-how, etc. This new shift has significant implications for the competitive balance of entire industries, regardless of company size, and it has implications across the global economic landscape. How do you see this new security threat evolving, and how should businesses respond?
BORG In 2004, when the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit started, we were concerned about intrusions into critical infrastructure facilities, such as chemical plants and refineries. We believed that some of these intrusions were reconnaissance in preparation for an attack that would cause physical destruction.
We got that one wrong, because there were no major attacks of that kind. Further investigation indicated that when the attackers were in the control networks, they gave equal attention to equipment regardless of its ability to blow things up.
What they were doing was copying every bit of operational plant data they could get their hands on: how everything was connected, all the control systems, and settings for every pressure and temperature switch and valve, etc. across the entire facility. They were not stealing traditional intellectual property such as trade secrets or proprietary processes but the plant's entire operational workflow.
Soon after these attacks, new facilities in those very industries were popping up in Southeast Asia.
No visitors were allowed, and we believe it's because they were exact replicas of attacked facilities.
From an economic standpoint, the degree to which you are ahead of your competition determines how much money you're going to capture from the market. The value reaped from being ahead is very dependent on your lead time as you develop your manufacturing facility. As a rule of thumb, when you open a new facility, you can reduce costs by 5 to 15 percent each year of operation for roughly the first six years. This amounts to a huge drop in cost, and for a lot of industries represents the majority of the profits. If someone can steal all the operational information it took you six years to develop and open a facility that on day one has the exact same level of efficiency, they have effectively stolen the majority of the profit for your facility.
What is being stolen is something enormously more valuable than what has been lost to credit card or bank fraud. This is a huge issue and puts these companies and potentially entire domestic industries in jeopardy of survival. the business that drives security, and security should protect and support valued business processes.
That's easier said than done.
There is also the ethical dilemma of assuming that my competitor and I do business in the same way. That is clearly asymmetric, because your competitor may not follow your business rules. It's hard enough to run a business, be ethical, and work within your regulatory framework without an actor coming in outside of that framework.
We need to: (a) educate people that there are others who work outside their business and ethical framework; and (b) define security as a function that works for you by supporting value-creating business processes.
BENNETT One of the key considerations is motivation. The two main business-attack motivations are money/greed and reputation. People behave differently according to their motivation and the type of business they're attacking. Stealing factory operations know-how is different from stealing information about the pricing of a product that's about to be launched. Both of these are very different from destroying the competition by destroying its reputation. There is a very real danger that many vendors will provide a good but narrow view of your network and miss the larger context that states, for example, that a user was not supposed to be able to log in from an undetermined physical location.
At Detica we have found real value in mining substantial levels of contextual data that corroborate not just what's happening in the network but what was happening with the individuals that access the network at that point in time. People should not be lulled into a sense of false security because they have purchased a specific niche security product.
CREEGER Are you saying that we have to start building a huge metadata infrastructure to determine if one event is consistent within a greater context? Who is going to write all these consistency rules that will flag events out of sync with expectations? Who is going to run all these services and on what platforms? How do we architect cost-effective solutions that expend additional cycles to monitor, audit, and determine to the second, third, fourth level whether the person's actually doing what's expected?
BORG What you are describing as a problem is a huge opportunity. There are five steps you have to follow to carry out a successful cyber attack: find the target; penetrate it; co-opt it; conceal what you have done long enough for it to have an effect; and do something that can't be reversed. Each of these is an opportunity to stop an attacker.
You can use these five steps to generate a comprehensive risk chart. By listing all the components of your information system such as hardware, software, networks, and so on, you can itemize the corresponding attack tools and their countermeasures. In this way you can produce a comprehensive security risk grid. Using this methodology to review various sites, we find that while attack tools are spread uniformly across the chart, defensive measures are piled into just a few areas. People typically put almost all their effort into penetration prevention and backup. Most of the other components have no defensive measure to offset defined threats.
We have a huge opportunity for the security industry to develop tools to do such things as quickly identifying bad behavior. Because bad behavior is highly specific to context and industry, security companies need to define industry-specific anomaly detection templates. I believe that is the only way that Andy [Clark]'s issues will be resolved. BORG Employees should never be told to protect valuable assets. If they're told this, they usually protect an object that may be expensive to replace but is not what creates or could destroy value.
How value is created is a business' most important asset, and that is what people must focus their protection resources on.
CREEGER Maybe a recommendation would be to take senior management to an off-site meeting and ask, "If you were a determined attacker to our business, what would you do to damage it or to recreate its value for some other set of shareholders?" BORG When we investigate the vulnerabilities of companies, we always get the engineers to sit down and red-team their own company.
CLARK If you take a slice across the whole company and not just senior management, you'll get much more value. You need an entire cross section of expertise and viewpoints. Also, don't be afraid to talk to other folks in your industry that are being exposed to the same threats. While they may be competitors on the business side, you all have a vested interest in lowering the industry-wide threat level. The bad guys talk all the time. If you don't have industryspecific contacts, you will be at an even larger disadvantage. It's probably the least expensive thing you can do to increase your security posture.
BENNETT Businesses need to understand an attacker's motivation to steal know-how, systems, and other assets. While the typical goal is to replicate and/or destroy the business, the protection of a business' reputation and the rigorous understanding of a business' vulnerabilities are not given the board-level visibility they require. New, young businesses actually understand this better than many medium-size, older businesses.
Attacks may not be just about money and may not be rationally motivated. A motivation for someone to destroy your business may not be "You lose, I win," but "You lose, I stay the same."
Given the current state of the recession, that cannot be discounted. EPSTEIN Too many organizations spend their information-security resources on protecting their firewalls and other fairly low-level things such as the protocol stack. The activity these days is all happening in the application layer. While a lot of the small and medium-size organizations are just now getting around to protecting the bottom layer, the bottom isn't where the problems are anymore.
If you look at the nature of network attacks, Microsoft, Cisco, etc. have done a reasonably good job. Just because they have pushed attackers higher in the service stack, however, doesn't mean the game is over for us defenders. We have to move our defenses higher as well. We can't just monitor firewall logs anymore. We now have to monitor application logs, and a lot of applications don't have logs. While boards have been hearing the mantra of antivirus, firewall, etc., they now need to understand that the threat has moved up the stack, and the defenses have to move there as well.
I think the cloud is, on the whole, a positive thing. As computer scientists, we need to come up with a way to give users advice on how to select a cloud provider. We need the equivalent of Consumer Reports for cloud providers supporting specific industries, especially for small and mediumsize businesses.
CREEGER My take-away is that security is really tied up intimately with the semantics of your business. For a long time, most people have treated security with a one-size-fits solution, usually putting fences around certain critical components without thinking about the real semantics of operations. My impressions from our conversation is not only do IT people need a real seat at the senior management table so they can make substantive contributions to its profitability, but they also need to understand the company's long-term strategy and operations intimately in order to avoid calamity. Q
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